An experimental testbed has been created for developing and evaluating Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal authentication techniques. The testbed advances the state of the art in GNSS signal authentication by subjecting candidate techniques to the strongest publicly-acknowledged GNSS spoofing attacks. The testbed consists of a real-time phase-coherent GNSS signal simulator that acts as spoofer, a real-time software-defined GNSS receiver that plays the role of defender, and post-processing versions of both the spoofer and defender. Two recently-proposed authentication techniques are analytically and experimentally evaluated: (1) a defense based on anomalous received power in a GNSS band, and (2) a cryptographic defense against estimation-and-replay-type spoofing attacks. The evaluation reveals weaknesses in both techniques; nonetheless, both significantly complicate a successful GNSS spoofing attack.

Cite and download the paper:
T.E. Humphreys, J.A. Bhatti, D.P. Shepard, and K.D. Wesson, "A Testbed for Developing and Evaluating GNSS Signal Authentication Techniques,"  International Symposium on Certification of GNSS Systems & Services (CERGAL), Dresden, Germany, 2014.