Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to spoofing attacks that deceive a victim receiver into reporting counterfeit position or time information. The primary contribution of this paper is a non-cryptographic GNSS anti-spoofing technique that “sandwiches” a spoofer between a correlation function distortion monitor and a total in-band power monitor. The defense exploits the difficulty of mounting an effective spoofing attack that simultaneously maintains a low-enough counterfeit signal power to avoid power monitoring alarms while minimizing distortions of the received cross- correlation profile that are indicative of a spoofing attack. Results presented in this paper demonstrate the defense’s effectiveness against a sophisticated spoofing attack.

Cite and download the paper:
K. Wesson, B. L. Evans, and T. Humphreys, "A Combined Symmetric Difference and Power Monitoring GNSS Anti-Spoofing Technique," 1st IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, Austin, TX, 2013.