Spotlight

Austin, TX—At the magazine’s annual Leadership Dinner, held during the ION-GNSS Conference, we gave the first GNSS Leadership Awards to four individuals for their respective work in the four fields of satellites, signals, services, and products. These are not lifetime or career achievement awards, but recognition of significant contribution in the last year or two. Think of them as the Oscars, the Academy Awards of GNSS, if you will, for significant recent achievement.

Several people were nominated in each category by a small group, then voted on by a larger group of about 40, including the magazine’s Editorial Advisory Board, the contributing editors, and a dozen industry executives.

In the Signals category: Todd Humphreys, Director, Radionavigation Laboratory, and assistant professor, University of Texas at Austin. Leader of several seminal studies on spoofing and jamming; testified this summer before Congress on the subject.

Continue reading the award notice that contains Dr. Humphreys’s acceptance speech.

“Could the next big trading glitch come from the sky? An expert in satellite technology says it’s possible, and he wants more traders and investors to be aware of the potential problem. The danger lies with the global positioning satellite system, according to Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering and engineering mechanics at the University of Texas at Austin. High frequency traders depend on GPS technology for accurate time signals to guide their trading strategies, but the satellite system’s rooftop receivers are vulnerable to jamming, he contends. GPS signals can also become the target of hacking attacks, known as “spoofing,” that can send out false time signals and disrupt trading, he adds.”

Continue reading the Institutional Investor article.

The GAO Report to Congressional Requestors titled “Unmanned Aircraft Systems” notes that: 

“GPS spoofing has also been identified as an emerging issue. Encrypting civil GPS signals could make it more difficult to “spoof” or counterfeit a GPS signal that could interfere with the navigation of a UAS. Non-military GPS signals, unlike military GPS signals, are not encrypted and transparency and predictability make them vulnerable to being counterfeited, or spoofed. In a GPS-spoofing scenario, the GPS signal going from the ground control station to the UAS is first counterfeited and then overpowered. Once the authentic (original) GPS signal is overpowered, the UAS is under the control of the “spoofer.” This type of scenario was recently demonstrated by researchers at the University of Texas at Austin at the behest of DHS. During the demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range, researchers spoofed one element of the unencrypted GPS signal of a fairly sophisticated small UAS (mini- helicopter) and induced it to plummet toward the desert floor. The research team found that it was straightforward to mount an intermediate- level spoofing attack, such as controlling the altitude of the UAS, but difficult and expensive to mount a more sophisticated attack. The research team recommended that spoof-resistant navigation systems be required on UAS exceeding 18 pounds.”

Continue reading the GAO report (GAO-12-981).

“Ease with which GPS can be spoofed raises concerns about civil UAVs. A video fo a small unmanned heicopter dropping from hover like a stone, its operator unaware control has been hijacked, threatens plans to open civil airspace to UAS (unmanned aerial systems) by exposing the vulnerability of GPS to counterfeit signals, or spoofing.”

Continue reading the Aviation Week and Space Technology article that features an interview with Dr. Humphreys.

“After testifying before Congress about security vulnerabilities in civil GPS systems last week, Todd Humphreys is convinced the industry needs a new approach to plugging holes in what he calls “the most popular unauthenticated protocol in the world.”

“There’s a way to add backward-compatible authentication like digital watermarks to GPS signals, and last week I had my best shot at convincing lawmakers to fix the problem at the signal source,” said Humphreys who directs the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin.”

Continue reading the EE Times article.

“A University of Texas team spent less than $1,000 to construct a GPS “spoofing” device that commandeered an unmanned aerial vehicle and sent it veering off course. After initially demonstrating the concept on campus in Austin, Assistant Professor Todd Humphreys and his team were invited out to White Sands, N.M., on June 19 by skeptical Department of Homeland Security officials and proved that they were able to divert a UAV from its flight path from about a kilometer away, according to a university news release. “The recent demonstration by University of Texas at Austin researchers is the first known unequivocal demonstration that commandeering a UAV via GPS spoofing is technically feasible,” the release states.”

Continue reading the Marine Corps Times article.

“One of the greatest advantages of drones—for gathering intelligence, patrolling borders, doing weather research, or killing terrorists—is that they can be piloted by people who are on the ground and far away. They can do dangerous, difficult, tedious tasks without requiring the risk of human lives. For their critics, there is a flip side to this: Drones risk making it too easy to kill without perceived consequences, or spy, or monitor every instant of everyone’s lives. Now there’s something new to worry about. If we can control our drones at a distance, what’s to ensure that someone else won’t do it, too? How easy would it be for someone to hijack a drone and Svengali-like, get it to do what they wanted, instead of its mission? Not as hard as one might hope. That’s what a team led by Todd Humphreys, an assistant professor at the University of Texas, Austin, and head of its Radionavigation Laboratory, proved last month.”

Continue Reading the Bloomber Businessweek Technology article.