Spotlight

Nextgov: Researcher Reveals GPS Vulnerabilities, October 2010

“GPS timing signals that control the base stations in some cellular networks and other gadgets the size of small refrigerators that power the smart electric grid can fall prey to sophisticated spoofing attacks, according to a University of Texas researcher. Todd Humphreys, an assistant professor at the University of Texas Radionavigation Laboratory, said he successfully spoofed a type of laboratory time reference receiver of the code division multiple access network technology Sprint and Verizon use that relies on GPS time—with a transmitter he built for about $1,000.”

Continue reading the Nextgov article.

MIT Technology Review: Hijacking Satellite Navigation, October 2008

“The Global Positioning System (GPS) lies at the heart of an increasing number of technologies, from vehicle navigation systems to the power grid. And yet, although the military version of GPS includes security features such as encryption, civilian signals are transmitted in the clear. Now, researchers at Cornell University and Virginia Tech have demonstrated a relatively simple way to fool ordinary GPS receivers into accepting bogus signals using a briefcase-size transmitter.”

Continute reading the MIT Technology Review article.

Dr. Humphreys Briefs National PNT EXCOM Advisory Board, October 2010

Washington, D.C. — Dr. Humphreys briefed the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Executive Committee (EXCOM) Advisory Board on civil GPS spoofing. His presentation, “Spoofing the Timing Signal: What Else is Vulnerable? Understanding Potential Impacts to Infrastructure,” highlighted the Radionavigation Lab’s radionavigation security research including the RNL civil GPS spoofer (video) and a proposal for GNSS message authentication.