Spoofing

Todd Humphreys is the Director of the Radionavigation Lab at the University of Texas at Austin, where he is also an Assistant Professor of Aerospace Engineering. As one of the world's leading experts on GPS technology, Dr. Humphreys caught the attention of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for his recent research on defending against intentional GPS jamming of drones over U.S. airspace.

On this episode of Game Changers, Professor Humphreys addresses the current use and future potential of GPS technology.

We're developing an extremely precise augmented reality (AR) system based on carrier-phase differential GPS (CDGPS). The system provides precise position and attitude, which can be used to display position- and attitude-specific objects and information in real-time.  The video below, dubbed "Pillars and Piston," is a first demonstration of our system's capability.  

This video illustrates the steps taken for successful drone capture. An earlier version of this video appeared in Dr. Humphrey's testimony to Congress in July 2012.

We demonstrate here the response of a GPS receiver's tracking loops to a spoofing attack.  The receiver's correlation function is displayed along a grid of taps about the peak.  The white trace is the in-phase component and the red is the quadrature component, where phase is compared to the prompt tap which is aligned with the correlation peak.  

 

We demonstrate here a spoofing attack against a GPS time reference receiver like those used for time synchronization in cell phone base stations. We also demonstrate a spoofing attach against a phasor measurement unit designed to synchronize the power grid. Download the video here (right click, save as) [70 MB].

To learn more about the Radionavigation Lab's civil GPS spoofer see the paper or the presentation.

 

An Android's GPS unit being spoofed with the Radionavigation Lab's civil GPS spoofer. For more information on the spoofer see the paper or the presentation.

 

An iPhone's GPS unit being spoofed with the Radionavigation Lab's civil GPS spoofer. For more information on the spoofer see the paper or the presentation.

 

The autocorrelation function of a GPS tracking channel under a spoofing attack.